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Crown Privilege in Regard to Upper Echelon 
Government Documentation
HENRIK G. TONNING*
This article reviews the common law pertaining to the manner in 
which courts have entertained claims of privilege by Crown authorities 
when the latter are requested to produce documents or submit to 
discovery. In considering the issue it deals specifically with executive 
level documentation and by examining recent trends, attempts to 
isolate some of the matters that must be addressed when a party 
attempts to wrench such material from the government’s grasp.
De quelle façon les tribunaux ont-ils disposé des revendications à un 
privilege de la part de la Couronne lorsqu’il lui est demandé de 
déposer des documents ou de se soumettre à un examen au préalable? 
Cet article tente d ’y répondre en faisant une étude du “common law” 
à ce sujet. L ’auteur discute plus précisément de la documentation au 
niveau exécutif. En procédant à l’analyse des tendances les plus 
récentes, il fait voir les différents aspects auxquels une partie doit 
toujours réfléchir lorsqu’elle veut soustraire de tels documents de 
l’étreinte du gouvernement fédéral.
Much to the delight o f civil libertarians, there has been a marked 
change in the manner in which courts are dealing with attempts by 
various Crown authorities to restrict the production o f upper echelon 
government documentation by claiming Crown privilege. As the number 
o f legal actions increases, litigants at all stages o f proceeding often find 
their requests for discovery or the production o f  documents denied 
whether the Crown is a party or not,1 on the ground that the evidence 
disclosed by submitting to an examination or production would be 
injurious to the public interest.
In the past, the courts have often considered high level 
documentation containing government policy and Cabinet proceedings 
as having an element o f public interest that warranted restricting its 
production regardless o f the interests o f  litigants. Although the more
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appropriate phrase is “public interest immunity”,2 this paper will 
continue to refer to this substantive rule o f  law as “Crown privilege”. In 
reviewing the relevant case law an attempt will be made to formulate a 
pragmatic approach to the hurdle that a claim o f  Crown privilege poses 
for a litigant engaging a Crown authority or attempting to make its case 
relying on various forms o f upper level government documentation.
Initially, at common law, the Crown was immune from discovery 
though on occasion it did allow itself to be discovered when public policy 
dictated. T h e House o f  Lords in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Company, 
Limited3 held that documents otherwise relevant and liable to production 
need not be produced if  the public interest required that they should be 
withheld. An objection, duly taken by the head o f a government 
department, usually by affidavit, was to be treated as conclusive.
This obviously harsh stance, though tempered by the Court o f 
Appeal on three occasions,4 stood for twenty-six years until the issue was 
readdressed by the House o f  Lords in Conway v. Rimmer.h Prior to this 
however, the Court o f Appeal in Merricks v. Nott-Bowers held that the 
nature o f the class o f document, and the reasons for its being withheld 
should be sufficiently described by the Crown to clearly justify why it 
was objecting to discovery. Later that same year in Re Grosvenor Hotel, 
London (No. 2 ) ,7 the Court o f Appeal suggested that reasons should be 
forthcoming to allow a proper balancing o f  the public interest served by 
non-disclosure, and the interests o f justice as between the parties. Similar 
considerations were reiterated in Wednesbury Corporation v. the Minister of 
Housing and Local Government. 8
T h e most enduring and well known o f these cases is Conway v. 
Rimmer.9 In recanting from the strong position taken in Cammell, Laird10 
the House o f Lords set forth a test which has received almost universal 
application with subtle refinements and is still most pertinent today. T h e 
following comment o f Lord Reid is generally considered to be the best 
expression o f this test.
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. . . [CJourts have and are entitled to exercise a power and duty to hold a 
balance between the public interest, as expressed by a Minister, to withhold 
certain documents or other evidence, and the public interest in ensuring the 
proper administration o f justice. That does not mean that a court will reject a 
Minister’s view: full weight must be given to it in every case, and if the 
Minister’s reasons are o f a character which judicial experience is not 
competent to weigh then the Minister’s view must prevail; but experience has 
shown that reasons giver, for withholding whole classes o f documents are 
often not o f that ch aracter."
Lord Morris reiterated Lord Reid’s comments and noted that the 
courts, rather than Ministers o f State, are independant bodies, and can 
most adequately weigh these competing aspects o f  public interest.12
Prior to Conway v. Rimmer the Canadian Courts adhered to a 
mechanical application o f  Cammell, Laird. 13 In 1954 however, the issue 
came before the Supreme Court o f Canada in R. v. Snider14 and the 
Court quickly rejected the absolute right o f a Crown Minister to claim 
such privilege. T h e case involved a criminal prosecution in which a 
provincial Attorney General desired the production o f various income 
tax returns filed with the Department o f National Revenue, and the 
Minister responsible objected by way o f  affidavit to their production, 
stating that it would be contrary to the public interest. T h e  Court noted 
that the privilege o f denying disclosure required as its essential condition 
that there be a public interest recognized as overriding the general 
principle that in the court o f  justice every person and every fact must be 
available for the execution o f its supreme function. Rand J .  commented 
that
Once the nature, general or specific as the case may be, o f documents o r the 
reasons against its disclosure, are shown, the question for the court is whether 
they might, on any rational view, either as to their contents or the fact o f  
their existence, be such that the public interest requires that they should not 
be revealed; if they are capable o f sustaining such an interest and a minister 
o f the Crown avers to its existence, then the cou ru  must accept his decision.
On the other hand, if the facts, as in the example before us, show that, in the 
ordinary case, no such interest can exist, then a declaration o f the minister 
must be taken to have been made under a misapprehension and be 
disregarded. T o  eliminate the courts in a function with which the tradition of  
the common law has invested them and to hold them subject to any opinion 
formed, rational o r irrational, by a member of the executive to the prejudice, 
it might be, o f the lives o f private individuals, is not in harmony with the basic 
conceptions o f our polity.1*
13Murray v. Murray, [1947] 3 D .L .R . 23 6  (B .C .S .C .); Weber v. Pawlik, [1952] 2  D .L .R . 750  (B .C .C .A .); 
M.N.R, v. Die-Plast Company Ltd., [1952 ] 2 D .L .R . 808  (Que. Q .B ., Appeal Side); Clemens v. Crown trust el 
aL, [1953] 2  D .L .R . 290  (Ont. C .A .).
“ [1954] S .C .R . 479 .
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As suggested by Kellock J . ,  where the documents and facts claimed 
to be privileged emanate from the public itself, as was the case with the 
income tax returns in R. v. Snider, a plea for non-disclosure on the basis 
that it would be prejudicial to the public interest is highly questionable.18
T h e decisions in Conway v. Rimmer, R. v. Snider and the requirement 
embodied therein, that courts weigh general public policy against the 
interest o f  justice, have been consistently applied in Canada.17 Admitting 
this to be the paramount consideration when any court finds itself 
confronted with a claim o f  Crown privilege, we will now examine this 
situation with specific application to upper level government documenta­
tion including that concerning the formation o f policy at the executive 
level, communications between Ministers and high level officials, and 
Cabinet Memoranda.
Both Conway v. Rimmer18 and R. v. Snider19 imply that there exists a 
general class o f document that the courts may be incompetent to weigh, 
and upon which a Minister’s opinion should be accepted. Substantial 
authority will later be noted that suggests the executive level 
documentation with which we are concerned is o f  such a class and 
contains the requisite public interest to require its being withheld, and 
further, that the opinion o f the appropriate Crown official should rarely 
be questioned when he attests that the evidence before the court is o f 
this nature.20
T h e courts have often held such high level documents to be 
superior to any public interest requiring disclosure on the basis that the 
production o f such documentation would hamper the operation o f 
governmental departments and restrict the candour with which top 
government officials execute their duties. Though the courts are holding 
such considerations to be o f less importance than they possibly once 
did,21 the restriction o f candour was a profound issue in a great many 
decisions22 and even though no longer determinative it does have its
'•Ibid.. at 488 .
17Reese et aL v. The Queen, [1955] Ex C .R . 187; Re Lew Fun Chaue (1955), 112 C .C .C . 264  (Ont. S .C .); 
Gagnon v. Quebec Securities Commission (1965), 50  D .L .R . (2d) 3 2 9  (S .C .C .); Re Board o f  Moosomm School 
Unit No. 9 and Gordon (1972 ), 24 D .L .R . (3d) 5 0 5 ; Huron Steel Fabricators London Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1972), 31 
D .L .R . (3d) 110 (F .C ., T .D .), a f fd . [1973] F.C . 808  (F .C .A .); R. v. Home stake Mining Company and Texas 
G ulf Potash Company. [1977] 3 W .W .R. 6 29  (Sask. C .A .).
'*Supra, footnote 12.
'*Supra, footnote 16.
t0Re Board o f  Moosomin School Unit No. 9 and Gordon etal, supra, footnote 17. See also: Attorney General 
fo r  Nova Scotia v. Murphy et al. (1979 ), 10 C .P .C . 279  (N .S.C .A .).
*'Supra, footnotes 5 and 15; Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank o f  England, [1979] 3 All E .R . 700.
**Re Lew Fun Chaue, supra, footnote 17; Gronlund et a l v. Hanson (1968), 64  W .W .R. 74 (B .C .C .A .); 
M.N.R. v. Die-Plast Company Ltd. supra, footnote 13, R. v. Lewes /ustices, ex parte The Gaming Board o f  Great 
Britain, [1971] 2  All E .R . 1126 (Q .B .) ; Rogers v. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, [1972] 2  All E .R . 
1057 (H .L .); D. v. N.S.P.C.C., [1978 ] A.C. 171 (H .L.).
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application in special circumstances, such as the executive level 
documentation under consideration here. When advancing the argu­
ment that the disclosure o f  such material would hamper the candour 
and completeness o f information contained therein, it is important to 
note that executive deponents are under no duty to supply the 
information. Indeed, where there is no obligation to come forward with 
the information contained in the documents, there is a possibility that 
they may be seen as privileged,23 but where a public servant is under a 
statutory duty to provide the information contained in material under 
consideration the candour and completeness argument may fall on deaf 
ears. As the Federal Court o f Appeal noted in Re Blais and Andros when 
dealing with a report prepared by the Superintendent in Bankruptcy,
It may be important to protect such communications on questions of general 
policy for the purpose o f ensuring candour and completeness of information 
and comm ent, but I find it difficult to conceive o f the report o f  a 
Superintendent in Bankruptcy, made in the course o f his statutory duties on 
the conduct by a trustee o f the affairs o f a bankrupt estate being less candid 
o r complete by reason o f his knowing that his report might be subject to 
disclosure.14
These comments on candour are noted not to derogate from this 
paper’s general proposition that many courts have held high level 
communications o f governmental affairs and policy to be unquestionably 
privileged, but rather, they are included to show that the courts are 
cognizant o f  this important component o f upper echelon decision and 
policy making. T h e necessity for restricting production o f such 
documentation in order to protect and preserve a high degree o f 
candour in governmental affairs recendy received favourable comment, 
albeit dicta, in the cases Sankey v. Whitlam and others25 and Attorney General 
x.Jonathan Cape Limited et al.26
Returning to internal government memoranda and cabinet minutes, 
it im posant to reiterate that such documentation is indeed different 
than that which has generally come before the courts and been subjected 
to a Crown authority’s claim o f privilege. We are not concerned with tax 
returns, police reports or any o f countless other reports prepared 
pursuant to legislation; we are dealing with a class o f  documentation 
which has often been seen as privileged per se, and which on the basis o f 
general comment in Conway v. Rimmer and R. v. Snider is entitled to 
restricted production merely because o f  its nature.
tsMurray v. Murray, supra, footnote 13; R. v. Lewes Justices, ex parte The Gaming Board o f  Great Britain and
D. v. N.S.P.C.C., supra, footnote 22.
,4(1973 ), 30  D .L .R . (3d) 287 , at 291 (F.C .A .).
“ (1978) 21 A.L.R. 505 (Aus. H.C.).
*•[1976] Q.B. 752.
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Support for this contention has early roots in Canadian law. In 
Dufresne Construction Company Limited v. The King27 certain memoranda 
prepared for the guidance o f  the Minister o f  Public Works were held to 
be privileged because o f  their nature. In Weber v. Pawlik, 28 though the 
Court refused to order the production o f  the documents in question, 
O ’Halloran J.A . argued strongly for it. He noted that in the instance 
before him production o f  the documents should not be denied since 
they did not deal with official government secrets, matters o f 
government policy, the defence o f  the state or inter-departmental 
communications. As well, in Re Lew Fun Chaue29 Master Marriott o f the 
Ontario Supreme Court held high level memoranda to the Minister o f 
Citizenship and Immigration to be privileged since the public interest 
required that the documents in question not be produced and the 
Minister had averred to the existence o f such an interest. A similar 
decision was reached in Reese v. The Queen30 where, in applying R. v. 
Snider the Court held that it would not order production o f 
inter-departmental communications between public officials when the 
head o f  a department had, in valid form, objected to their production 
on the ground that they belonged to a particular class o f documents 
which is not in the public interest to disclose. Even if the prerogative o f 
the Crown in Canada was not as absolute as it was in England prior to 
Conway v. Rimmer, “there is a public interest which requires that 
inter-departmental communications between public officials should not 
be produced.”31
In Gagnon v. Quebec Securities Commission32 the Supreme Court o f 
Canada adopted the reasoning o f  the English Court o f Appeal in Re 
Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2 )33 and suggested that although a court 
should satisfy itself that the interests o f state served by non-production 
outweighed the interests o f the litigants to the dispute, this was generally 
not necessary where the documents involved military secrets, diplomatic 
exchanges, cabinet papers or political decisions made in high places. T h e 
Federal Court o f Appeal in Re Blais and Andras34 conjectured that it 
would not have as readily ordered the production o f  documents had 
they dealt with questions o f policy and administration o f the Bankruptcy 
Act rather than being a simple report made pursuant to a particular 
provision o f  that Act. T h e special status afforded documents o f this
*T[ 193.3] Ex. C .R . 77.
**Supra, footnote 13.
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nature was also confirmed in Re Regina and Vanguard Hutterian Brethren 
Inc.,3* where the Court held that all conversations with and reports 
made to superior departmental officers by government employees; as 
well as reports to a Cabinet Committee and various interested Ministers 
were o f a class that entitled the Crown to restrict their production by 
claiming privilege.
In addition to this Canadian line o f authority, which admittedly 
contains decisions o f  varying weight, there is a similar trend in 
numerous English cases which suggests there may be some types o f 
documents that are exempted from the classic balancing process 
elaborated by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer.39
T h e existence o f this trend was clearly confirmed in Sankey v. 
Whitlam and others37 and Burma Oil Company v. Bank of England, 38 where 
the Courts began eroding the independent nature o f this class o f 
documents and clearly stated that even the previously paramount public 
interest served by restricting the production o f such upper echelon 
government memoranda can at times be outweighed by the interests o f 
the litigants to a dispute.
T h e  matter came before the High Court o f Australia in Sankey v. 
Whitlam in a criminal conspiracy charge against the form er Prime 
Minister o f Australia, where the Court had to contend with a claim o f 
privilege over cabinet minutes, memos from senior departmental 
officials and other notations from top level files. It is interesting to note 
that the claim o f  privilege advanced by the Crown was not based on 
injury to either the proper functioning o f the public service or to a public 
harm, but rather was based on the concept that the documents in 
question were o f  a general class that is in and o f itself privileged. T h e 
Court noted that such a class does exist and that cabinet minutes and 
records o f discussion between the heads o f  various government 
departments are generally privileged per se39 but the Court, considering 
the test in Conway v. Rimmer, held that even the public interest served by 
non-disclosure must be weighed against a possible frustration o f  the 
administration o f  justice.
Gibbs A .C.J. noted that various papers brought into existence for 
preparing submissions to Cabinet as well as documents relating to the 
formation o f  high level government policy were generally considered 
privileged.40 In doing so he referred to Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer
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who concluded that such a privilege could extend to “all documents 
concerned with policy making within departments, including it may be, 
minutes and the like by quite ju n io r officials and correspondence from 
outside bodies”.41 He held however, that despite the existence o f this 
privileged class, the courts must weigh the issues with care, and if 
necessary inspect the documents themselves to ensure a proper 
determination. W here, on the facts o f the case, the interest in the proper 
administration o f  justice outweighs any served by withholding the 
material, the Court must order the production o f  the documents despite 
their previous immunity. Since the issue in Sankey v. Whitlam concerned 
the proper execution o f  governmental duties by senior officials the 
Court felt it improper to withhold such documents since the policy 
proposals that the documents dealt with were never put into effect and 
they were the very crux o f  the plaintiffs conspiracy case.42
Similar considerations were voiced by Steven J .  when he noted that 
the public interest varies from case to case, and though the law on the 
subject gives an unqualified recognition o f  the entitlement o f such 
documents to privilege, such a claim o f privilege based merely on the 
class o f document carries a heavy onus to be dispelled. W here the 
documents are needed to ensure the administration o f justice or relate 
to policies o f  purely historical significance, the Crown is not entitled to 
claim privilege and must produce the documents. It is important to 
rem em ber that in Sankey v. Whiilam the issue before the Court was the 
proper execution o f duties entrusted to senior government officials and 
the documents requested were an integral part o f  the plaintiffs case.
In Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England43 the House o f Lords was 
faced with a similar problem. Burmah Oil was in serious financial 
difficulty and as it was deemed to be in the national interest to save the 
undertaking from liquidation, the Company, the Bank o f England and 
various governmental departments entered into negotiations which 
resulted in Burm ah’s receiving financial assistance. T h e action also 
resulted however, in a suit by Burmah against the Bank to set aside a 
requisite sale o f  stock on the grounds that the sale was unconscionable, 
inequitable, in breach o f  the Bank’s duty o f fair dealing and at an 
undervalue. T h e  documents subject to the claim o f privilege disclosed the 
part played by the Crown, and consisted o f  communications to and trom 
Ministers, memoranda from senior representatives o f the various 
companies, and material dealing generally with the formation o f  
governmental policy.
In their decision, the Law Lords gave practical effect to the 
principles expounded in Sankey v. Whitlam, and though they did not
*'Supra, footnote 5, at 888 .
41Supra, footnote 25 , at 532.
*3Supra, footnote 40.
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order the production o f  the documents in question since they were not 
necessary to a fair disposition o f the matter, they did define some o f the 
considerations a court should be cognizant o f when weighing the public 
interest served by non-production against a proper administration o f 
justice between the parties. Lord Scarman briefly noted that the 
withholding o f  government documentation dealing with various policy 
decisions was undoubtedly in the public interest for it is important to 
ensure adequate candour in the advice tendered to ministers o f the 
Crown and to avoid capricious, ill-formed criticism in regard to policy 
decisions.44 Lord W ilberforce, in keeping with recent authority,45 
suggested that when dealing with documents concerning the formation 
o f government policy it is important to consider the time frame 
involved. Since all is not “past history”, restricted production is often 
necessary to ensure an effective implementation o f  policy, though where 
the documents in question are merely o f an historical nature, they 
should not be withheld.46 Lord Edmund-Davies, in an interesting 
judgm ent, suggested that there are three criteria a court should review 
when faced with restricting production on the basis o f a claim o f  Crown
f>rivilege: the weight o f the documents themselves, the importance o f the itigation to the parties, and the possibility that the docum ents’ being 
withheld would result in a denial o f natural justice. Since the documents 
before the Court in Burmah Oil were not o f  such a nature as to result in 
the latter possibility, the court refused to order their production.
T h e  decisions in Sankey v. Whitlam and Burmah Oil represent a 
substantial weapon for any litigant attempting to thwart a claim of 
Crown privilege. No longer is the production o f executive level 
documentation to be restricted without question, for as a result o f these 
recent cases, the benefit to be gleaned by the public from 
non-production must be weighed against the interests o f  the litigants 
themselves. It is submitted that this approach is indeed more rational 
than the ‘carte blanche’ immunity evidenced earlier, and although a 
Crown authority does not have the unlimited protection previously 
enjoyed, the documentation with which we are concerned can still be 
said to be o f  such a class as to deserve restricted production once a 
num ber o f requisite conditions exist.
Various aspects noted in Sankey v. Whitlam and Burmah Oil must now 
be considered. T h e candour argument still contains substantial merit, 
the historical perspective o f the evidence in question, and the effective 
implementation o f the policies contained therein must be looked at, as 
well as the possible erosion o f Cabinet solidarity on sensitive issues and 
the relevance or importance o f the desired evidence to the case o f those 
desiring production. Though on previous occasions these various
44tbuL. at 733.
AiSupra, footnote 26.
**Supra, footnote 40, at 7.07.
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elements have often been seen as independently definitive, they must 
now be considered interdependent and weighed together against the 
interests o f the litigants and the necessity o f fairly disposing o f the 
matter between them. This is not to suggest that the outcome o f the 
claim o f  Crown privilege will in all cases change. It does suggest, as in 
Burmah Oil, that there is now a crack in the stone wall through which an 
enterprising litigant can argue. A rational consideration o f the 
arguments for non-production, in view o f the interests o f the parties to a 
litigation, may necessitate the production o f  upper echelon government 
material that was previously immune.
Sankey v. Whitlam and Burmah Oil now bring the production and 
examination o f executive level material in line with the treatment o f 
other evidence in the possession o f Crown authorities which can only be 
seen as a favourable development. While the final disposition in any 
particular case may not alter, it at least affords a party desiring 
production a chance to hear and meet those arguments compelling 
non-production.
In retrospect a quick comparison o f  Cammell, Laird and Sankey v. 
Whitlam is instructive. While in both, the appropriateness o f the outcome 
cannot be questioned and would no doubt be the same today, the 
form er was correcdy viewed with skepticism while the trend evidenced 
in Sankey v. Whitlam and Burmah Oil represents a welcome progression in 
a time when the closeted dealings o f government engender increasing 
suspicion.
